Transdisciplinarity in Science and Religion, 4-2008 by Basarab Nicolescu, Magda Stavinschi, Eric Weislogel

By Basarab Nicolescu, Magda Stavinschi, Eric Weislogel

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The upshot is that for both one-way causal reduction theories and for dualist theories, taking an exclusivist view of any two kinds of realities to be related results in no idea of either and no idea of any interaction that could hold between them. Rejecting all reductionist views has many ramifications. , the grounds for believing that any specific kind of thing can exist “in itself”. It also utterly undermines the notion that our experience consists of purely (internal), sensory perceptions that can never be identified with purely (external) physical objects.

The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, London, MacMillan, 1970, p. 160. 15. Of course, being distinguishable and able to be spoken of are passive properties as opposed to active ones, but they are no less really properties of a book for that reason. If a book itself lacked the property of being logically distinguishable, we could form no concept of it, and if it did not possess the property of being able to be referred to, we could not speak of it. The active and passive senses in which properties can be possessed will shortly be explained in more detail.

What idea is left of the entire physical kind of properties-and-laws when we try to think of it aside from time and space, every quantity, and without being logically distinguishable from all that is non-physical? The conclusion yielded by this experiment is that despite all the ingenuity and ink that have been spent in time defending materialism or trying to find exceptions to its all-encompassing claims, its central claim never had any sense at all. We cannot so much as frame the idea of anything exclusively physical.

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